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Abstract 
 
A large body of research has been built up in the attempt to explain the occurrence of 
terrorism. The majority of this work has focussed at the structural level of analysis (political, 
social and economic causal factors) or at the individual level (terrorist personality, 
psychopathology and abnormality). This paper attempts to formulate a group-level 
explanation of terrorism. The first section summarises the existing literature, in order to 
establish why a group perspective is important. The following chapter explores the processes 
underlying how individuals come to accept radical ideologies and join violent political 
groups. The final section evaluates psychological theories of group dynamics (including 
obedience and conformity, groupthink, group polarisation and social identity processes) that 
may help to explain how and why certain groups come to accept terrorism as justifiable 
course of action. Though a group-processes account is by no means a definitive explanation 
of terrorism, it can help to integrate other levels of analysis; explaining why groups of 
seemingly normal individuals may react to certain environmental conditions with terroristic 
violence. Furthermore, this approach allows terrorism to be viewed as the result of interactive 
processes, rather than simply the aggregation of static factors. This approach is therefore a 
promising one, and indicates that further research is needed into the dynamics of terrorist 
groups. 
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Introduction 
 
Researchers from many disciplines, including sociology, politics, economics and psychology, 
have all contributed to an ever-growing discourse which seeks to explain why terrorism 
occurs. This body of research has helped to build a picture of potential determinants of 
terrorism from the large-scale (e.g. poverty, oppression, lack of political representation) to the 
small-scale (e.g. individual terrorist psychology, political perceptions, alienation). As 
terrorism is almost exclusively perpetrated by individuals who are embedded in radical 
political groups, the following paper will attempt to assess how social and group 
psychological processes may act to drive terrorism. By treating terrorism as a dynamic 
process, rather than an aggregation of a number of static factors, it is hoped that the paper 
will be able to contribute to a better understanding of how apparently ‘normal’ individuals 
may progress to carry out such violent acts. 
Firstly, it is necessary to define a number of important terms. Perhaps the most 
important, and yet most difficult, among these definitions is that of ‘terrorism’. The term 
‘terrorism’ originally appeared in discussions the post-revolution ‘reign of terror’ in France 
from 1793 to 1798. This described the use of violence and mass extermination of ‘enemies of 
the revolution’ by Maximilien Robespierre and the new French Government, intended to 
stifle dissent among the population (Fromkin, 1975). To a large extent, modern usage of the 
term agrees with this; terrorism is widely viewed as the use of violence or threatened violence 
against ‘civilians’ or ‘non-combatants’ for political ends (White, 2006). There is, however, 
considerable debate and disagreement over different factors of this definition. Held (2004), 
for example, suggests that terrorism need not necessarily be against civilian targets. 
Furthermore, some suggest that terrorism is exclusively the domain of sub-state actors; the 
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official definition of terrorism set out in the US Code (and used by the CIA and other 
agencies), for example, describes terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (US 
Department of State, 1999). The majority of terrorism researchers, however, agree that states 
may also use violence to intimidate civilians for political reasons (Sproat, 1996).  
Despite such disagreements, it is necessary to come to a working definition for this 
paper. On the basis of general, but by no means complete, consensus, ‘terrorism’ is defined 
here as the use of actual or threatened violence intended to spread a message of fear to 
civilians for political purposes
1
.  This is not to say that this is a universally acceptable 
definition (if such a thing were even possible), but rather it should function adequately for the 
purposes of this discussion. Where relevant theoretical opinion differs or this definition 
becomes insufficient in the course of this paper, it will be reconsidered. Furthermore, 
terrorism is a politicised and pejorative term; very few of those engaged in political violence 
would classify themselves as terrorists, and it is often used by both sides in a conflict to 
describe the others. It is therefore important to stress that, for the sake of accuracy and 
impartiality; the term ‘terrorism’ as used in this paper describes a tactic that is used by certain 
groups, and not the groups themselves
2
. 
Secondly, it is also very important to define what constitutes a ‘group’. Taken widely, 
a group can be any collection of people with some shared association; from a family to a 
culture or society. For social psychologists, however, the term is applied more specifically, to 
mean a collection of people who are in some way “interdependent and have at least the 
potential for mutual interaction” (Taylor, Peplau & Sears, 2003:308). Though this has 
                                                          
1
 It is worth noting that, as the focus here is group-level dynamics in non-state groups, only sub-state actors are 
examined in this paper. 
2
 Many different actors use terroristic tactics for varied reasons and to achieve different goals, and categorisation 
on the basis of a tactic is therefore arbitrary. Where the term ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorist group’ is used, it is therefore 
shorthand for an individual or group that engages in terrorism.  
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traditionally meant face-to-face contact, the rise of expanded avenues for communication and 
interaction such as the internet has affected group psychology research considerably. For the 
sake of this paper, then, a form of Taylor et al’s definition will suffice; the groups under 
scrutiny here are obviously political in nature (with shared ideology or identity) and consist 
of individuals interacting face-to-face, and also (in the more recent examples) via the internet 
and other communications channels. Again, where definitions of the ‘group’ vary from this, it 
will be discussed. 
 As mentioned above, the purpose of this paper is to examine the psychological 
processes that may play a part in driving terrorism. The first chapter will briefly explore the 
research into structural causes of terrorism; political, economic and social. Following this, the 
relevance of psychological theories to terrorism will be explored. It will be seen that, given 
the paucity of corroborating evidence and conceptual problems and biases in the research, 
existing individual-level explanations (personality and psychopathology) are inadequately 
prepared to explain terrorism. The subsequent chapters will examine the psychology of 
terrorism from a social and group-psychological perspective; thus placing the individual in 
context and recognising the path to terrorism as a dynamic process. Chapter two will 
therefore assess the processes behind the individual’s engagement with radical politics and 
associated groups. Chapter three will then explore how the dynamic psychological processes 
between individuals within radical political groups may act to impel its members to commit 
terrorism. Finally a conclusion will be drawn, drawing together the findings of the chapters, 
and suggesting avenues for future research and application. 
 A brief note is required on the methodology of this paper. Modern psychological 
research is largely empirical in outlook; concerned with the production and direct evaluation 
of hypotheses through scientific methods. The constraints of the dissertation mean that this 
paper does not apply experimental methods to terrorism. Instead, psychological theories that 
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may be relevant to terrorism will be evaluated in terms of their conceptual applicability and 
the strength of their research base. No single case study will be examined, as terrorism is an 
extremely diverse phenomenon. Instead, general conclusions will be supported by examples 
from varied terrorist groups. Where the type or structure of these groups affects the 
psychological processes being examined, it will be explored. 
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Chapter 1. The origins of terrorism: Towards a group-level explanation. 
 
Many different theories have been proposed in the attempt to ascertain why terrorism occurs. 
Researching the causes of terrorism therefore quickly reveals a complex picture of interacting 
factors and processes, all leading certain individuals and groups to use violence against 
civilians in the pursuit of political goals. Such research has generally looked either from a 
top-down perspective (such as political, economic or social factors) or bottom-up perspective 
(such as terrorist demographic profiles, personality etc.) (Victoroff, 2005:11).  
Obviously it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all of these in any great 
depth; however it is necessary to mention them briefly in order to properly situate a group-
level analysis within the existing terrorism literature. This chapter will therefore seek to 
provide an overview of terrorism causation research. Firstly, some possible macro-level 
causes of terrorism will be briefly outlined, including structural factors and relative 
deprivation. Following this, individual-level approaches to terrorism (mental illness and 
terrorist personality) will be evaluated
3
. The conceptual and practical problems for these 
approaches will be discussed, in order to outline the need for a group-level psychological 
process approach to terrorism. 
 
As terrorism is a political phenomenon, the obvious place to start an examination of the 
causes of terrorism is at the ‘macro’ level of analysis, which includes political social and 
economic conditions. Crenshaw (1981) provides a useful exploration of social conditions 
which may “directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns” (Crenshaw, 1981:381). 
                                                          
3
 Terrorist profiling lies at the individual-level of analysis, but is descriptive rather than explanatory (in that it 
does not provide direct theories of why the identified individuals engage in terrorism) and thus is omitted from 
this discussion.  
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Evidently groups do not engage in violence against civilians without a perceived injustice 
which they seek to right and without the opportunities to engage in terrorism. According to 
Crenshaw (1981), a ‘concrete grievance’ among a subset of the population, such as state 
discrimination against an ethnic or religious group, may inspire politically-motivated 
violence; this is perhaps demonstrated by examples of nationalist terrorist groups who 
consider themselves to be oppressed by the majority-led polity (e.g. the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam or ETA).  
Secondly, a “lack of opportunity for political participation” (Crenshaw, 1981:383) 
may also cause terrorism. Where no alternative avenues for political representation exist, and 
groups are frustrated in their legitimate attempts to attain political efficacy, terrorism may 
seem like the only remaining course of action for achieving their aims. This, suggests 
Crenshaw, is especially true when it affects the elites of a society, who may be frustrated by 
their inability to affect the polity despite their relative privilege
4
.  
Crenshaw also highlights the importance of precipitating factors in driving terrorism. 
These are events which shock a certain subset of the population and cause some individuals 
to believe that violent action is required immediately, such as recent use of extreme force 
against a group by the government
5
. 
 Other structural explanations for terrorism have also been advanced. Some 
researchers have for example, indicated that poverty or a lack of education may drive 
political violence, including terrorism. This follows the logic of relative deprivation theory 
(Gurr, 1970), which posits that when a societal group is frustrated by their own deprivation 
                                                          
4
 Crenshaw (1981) also suggests a number of strategic reasons that groups may use terrorism. These include 
disrupting or discrediting the polity (by making them appear unable to protect their citizens), causing harsh 
retaliation from the government (in order to create sympathy in their constituency), or internal functions such as 
morale building or discipline within the group.  
5
 Della Porta (1992:267), for example, points out that a perception that “the state had broken the rules of the 
democratic game”, through police brutality or an attack on civilians, provoked vengeful violence in left-wing 
militants. 
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and inability to pursue life goals they may react with collective violence. As Martin 
(2006:93) puts it; “when a group’s rising expectations are met by sustained repression or 
second-class status, the group’s reaction may include political violence.” People who wish to 
attain, for example, wealth and education (and they value the security and resources that they 
can get from these) may, if they are frustrated in their attempts to get these, turn to the 
‘weapon of the weak’, i.e. terrorism. To some extent, this theory is intuitive, and appears to 
be supported by the fact that terrorism is often carried out in the name of those who are 
impoverished or of low socio-economic status (SES) (such as Palestinian terrorism or 1970’s 
left-wing terrorism).  
In actual fact the evidence for the association between relative deprivation and 
violence is equivocal (Martin, 2006). Krueger and Malečková (2003), for example, analysed 
Hezbollah militants and Palestinian terrorists, and found no negative correlation between 
poverty and education and terrorism. They even found a possible positive correlation; 
indicating that these terrorists may in fact have higher SES than the majority of their 
constituency. It would therefore appear that, rather than directly causing terrorism by 
mobilising the ‘masses’, poverty and education could cause terrorism by motivating the elites 
to take action because of their perceptions of injustices.  
Though this is only a brief discussion of the possible structural causes of terrorism, a 
number of important factors have been explored. It would be incorrect, however, to treat 
terrorism as simply being a consequence of structural, political and economic factors alone. 
Though many people may be affected by such factors, only a tiny percentage will actually 
engage with terrorism. Just as poverty and lack of education in a societal group appears only 
to have an effect through elites’ perceptions of injustice; any grievance must be mediated by 
individuals themselves. That is to say, in order to become manifest as terrorism, such factors 
must motivate certain members of the society to turn to violence against other civilians as an 
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attempt to solve the perceived injustice. For this reason, many researchers have also 
attempted to understand terrorism from the level of the individual. If only certain people will 
react violently to macro factors, then perhaps it is possible to identify key features or factors 
that can determine who will become a terrorist. 
 
One of the first avenues for investigation into terrorist psychology is the search for 
psychopathology or mental illness in terrorists. For many, the violence and destruction caused 
by terrorism is incomprehensible, and consequently terrorists are often labelled as ‘mad 
bombers’. The apparent callous disregard for human life shown by terrorists, for example, 
could suggest that terrorists must be ‘psychopaths’. Indeed, individuals exhibiting 
psychopathy
6
 do appear to show some similarities to terrorists; for example aggressiveness, a 
lack of remorse or empathy for their victims and violation of societal norms and rules 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Furthermore, the actions of psychopathic 
individuals often harm people or property, much like the actions of terrorists. 
 There are, however, a number of significant problems with attempting to explain 
terrorism in terms of psychopathy. Most notably, psychopaths tend to be egocentric in 
motivation, and so their violence is self-serving and their targets personal. In contrast, 
terrorists tend to be ‘altruists’; their violent actions are intended to create positive outcomes 
for the ‘masses’ or their particular constituency, and their targets tend to be incidental and 
symbolic (Horgan, 2005). A psychopath’s selfish agenda would therefore be incompatible 
with a politically-motivated group’s chosen goals. Victoroff (2005: 13) points out that 
terrorists are “often regarded by their in-group as being heroic freedom fighters”. This 
suggests that terrorists fighting to right social injustices or inequalities perceived by their 
                                                          
6
 Or antisocial personality disorder as it is often called in clinical diagnosis. 
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constituencies may be engaged in a form of pro-social rather than antisocial behaviour. From 
the perspective of the targeted group terrorist behaviour is naturally antisocial, but it is 
important to bear in mind that such judgements are culture- and group-centric.  
Furthermore, a number of researchers have suggested that psychopathic individuals 
may be a significant liability for terrorist groups. Psychiatrist and terrorism researcher Marc 
Sageman (2008) points out that such individuals are “so self-centred that they have no 
consideration for others in the organization” (ibid. p.63). Terrorist groups, due to their need 
for security, require members to form strong interpersonal ties and remain committed to the 
group, and so egocentric and unstable psychopathic individuals are likely to be avoided. This 
does not mean that there are no psychopaths at all in terrorist groups. Instead it would seem 
that, due to the problems that they may cause for a given ‘terrorist’ group, it is unlikely that 
psychopathy is the main driving force behind terrorism. 
Some have even suggested that terrorists, especially suicide terrorists, may be 
suffering from depression or post-traumatic stress disorder (Perina, 2006). Terrorists have 
often witnessed violent events themselves, and so terrorism may be a self-destructive tactic 
used to escape from emotional pain. In his study of suicide terrorists, however, Pape (2005) 
noted that “suicide terrorists are acting on the basis of motives fundamentally different from 
those that underlie ordinary suicide and would probably not commit suicide absent the special 
circumstances that create these motives” (ibid, p.172). Suicide terrorists therefore wish 
primarily to further their chosen cause (an ‘altruistic’ motive) rather than to relieve their own 
suffering (an ‘egoistic’ motive). Again, there is little evidence that mental illness is a 
significant factor in driving terrorism. 
There have also been attempts to understand the terrorist as an individual by building 
a ‘personality profile’, or a set of personal characteristics that predispose them towards 
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political violence. Most prominent among this approach are those who suggest that terrorists 
often exhibit signs of narcissism
7
. Narcissistic individuals have a grandiose, inflated self 
image, are highly egocentric, and tend to lack empathy towards others. Taking a 
psychodynamic approach
8
 Pearlstein (1991) advanced a ‘narcissistic rage’ theory of 
terrorism. This posits that, when narcissists suffer ‘narcissistic injury’, i.e. a threat to their 
grandiose self-image, they are likely to be impulse towards violence in order to protect their 
self esteem. Thus, if they encounter value systems, beliefs or social environments that differ 
from their own, they interpret this as a threat to their own, fragile ego and thus engage in 
‘defensive’ attacks to protect themselves.  Pearlstein therefore suggests that narcissistic injury 
is a major psychological impetus towards terrorism. 
John Horgan (2003), however questions Pearlstein’s account of terrorist psychology, 
arguing that he “does not consider the literature critically enough” (ibid. p.13). In support of 
his claims, Pearlstein gives his interpretations of second hand biographical information on 
nine selected terrorists (e.g. Carlos the Jackal and Ulrike Meinhof). Such evidence is 
subjective and anecdotal, lacking any systematic scientific analysis or a comparable ‘control’ 
group. Furthermore, the cases chosen are ‘oddities’; “unrepresentative of the heterogenic 
‘unknown’ rank-and-file members of terrorist organisations around the world” (ibid. p.13). 
Thus on the basis of Pearlstein’s evidence alone, it is difficult to conclude that terrorists are 
narcissists. 
Post (1990), also believes that narcissism may play a role in driving terrorism, but 
takes a less deterministic approach. He instead suggests that there is no evidence of major 
psychopathology in terrorists, but instead argues that terrorists may often exhibit some of the 
                                                          
7
 Others have suggested that terrorists may be stress-seekers (Crenshaw, 1986) or have aggressive personalities 
(Plous & Zimbardo, 2004); however these theories have been much less influential. A discussion of narcissistic-
rage theory should sufficiently illustrate the problems with the personality approach. 
8
 The psychodynamic approach to psychology involves explaining personality and behaviour in terms of 
unconscious drives, often with an emphasis on the role of childhood experiences in the formation of these 
mental processes. 
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symptoms/traits of narcissistic personality disorder; namely ‘splitting’ and ‘externalisation’. 
According to Post (1990), terrorist biographies often reveal that the individuals had high 
levels of conflict with their parents as a child, and have “demonstrated a pattern of failure 
both educationally and vocationally” (Post, 1990:28). Many seem to share this view of 
terrorists being ‘failures’; for example UK Director of Public Prosecutions Sir Ken 
McDonald, commenting on the July 7
th
 (7/7) London bombers, referred to the terrorists as 
“deluded, narcissistic inadequates” (McDonald, 2007, as quoted in The Times, 2007, Jan 24).  
The suggestion is that such experiences can cause a person’s personality to ‘split’ into 
good and bad; the good is held as their own self-image, whereas the bad is externalised (and 
thus projected) onto others in their environment. If the polity or any other societal group 
displays different values, they will become “a target to blame for his own inner weakness and 
inadequacies” (Post, 1990: 27), and thus a potential target for terroristic aggression. Post 
rejects the possibility that “all terrorists suffer... narcissistic personality disorders or that the 
psychological mechanisms of externalization and splitting are used by ever terrorist” (ibid, 
p.27), and instead suggests that these symptoms are common among terrorists and may 
contribute to the terrorist mind-set. 
There may, indeed, be some merit in highlighting the role of value conflict in driving 
terrorism. The wish to replace the polity’s value system with another is often the aim of 
terrorists
9
. Nevertheless, there are considerable conceptual and methodological problems with 
this approach. Firstly, the evidence presented in support of the narcissistic rage hypothesis is 
suspect. Post refers to Bollinger’s (1982, as cited in Post, 1990) study of 250 West German 
terrorists, which reported a prevalence of “narcissistic wounds and a predominant reliance on 
the psychological mechanisms of splitting and externalization” (Post, 1990:29) in terrorists. 
                                                          
9
 For example al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya’s attempts to replace the secular Egyptian government with an Islamic 
state, or the Brigate Rosse’s desire to replace the Italian government with a revolutionary Communist system. 
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Horgan (2005) points out that these interviews were with suspected terrorists undergoing trial 
and that the interviewees were often reluctant to cooperate with the researchers. Furthermore, 
there was no control group with which to make a valid comparison, and the subjective nature 
of open-ended interview techniques means that results are likely to be affected by the 
interviewer’s own biases. The stresses and pressures of terrorist group membership may also 
change the individual’s personality, meaning that it is difficult to predict involvement in 
terrorism on the basis of interviews conducted after arrest.  
There are also significant conceptual problems with the 
psychodynamic/psychoanalytic approach taken by Post, Pearlstein and others. The 
psychoanalytic conceptual framework assumes that terrorism is driven by internal factors that 
must be inferred (Horgan, 2003); i.e. unconscious injuries, motivations and drives. The 
researchers must therefore rely on their own interpretations of what is occurring within the 
terrorists’ minds; interpretations that lack falsifiability and cannot be tested scientifically. 
Indeed, in mainstream psychological research, psychodynamic theory has been largely 
rejected in favour of more empirically-based and less subjective approaches.  
If psychology is to play a part in explaining terrorism, then it is perhaps more useful 
to apply theories and methods that are currently accepted in psychological research. 
Obviously terrorism research exists within an entirely different set of constraints; large-scale 
surveys of terrorists are difficult if not impossible. Furthermore, even if such a study were 
conducted, the applicability of the results might be limited. For example, even if it were 
found that narcissists are more likely to become terrorists, there are many individuals with 
narcissistic personalities and still only a small proportion of these will actually engage in 
terroristic activities. The correlation between personality traits and actual behaviour across 
multiple situations varies considerably (Steinberg, 2004); it is therefore probable that it is the 
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interaction of the individual with environmental and situational variables that is most 
important in driving terrorism.  
As a consequence of this, Arena and Arrigo (2006) point out that researchers pursuing 
personality-based theories of terrorism are committing the ‘fundamental attribution error’; the 
phenomenon whereby individuals tend to “overemphasise internal causes and personal 
responsibility and to deemphasise external causes and situational influences” (Steinberg, 
2004:A37) when explaining the behaviour of others. Being mindful of the tendency toward 
fundamental attribution error is important in studying the psychological origins of terrorism, 
as it can cloud our understanding of the complicated and interactive nature of the 
phenomenon. 
The idea that we can explain terrorism in terms of the internal attributes of the 
terrorist themselves, be it personality or psychopathology, may stem from biased assumptions 
in the research. Silke (1998) argues that terrorism researchers have been guilty of assuming 
that, because of the heinous nature of the acts; anyone who could commit a terrorist act must 
be ‘mad or bad’. There is a growing realisation that terrorists may not be abnormal 
individuals. On the basis of her research on Palestinian terrorists, Nassr Hassan (2002, quoted 
in Plous & Zimbardo, 2004:9) concluded “what is frightening is not the abnormality of those 
who carry out suicide attacks, but their sheer normality.” 
This ‘us versus them’ approach has probably arisen because the idea that any person 
could become a terrorist, given the right environmental conditions, is a potentially 
uncomfortable and disquieting one. Furthermore, demonising and stereotyping one’s enemies 
is natural and common to almost all groups (Duckitt, 2003). Seeing enemies as ‘mad’ or 
fundamentally different to oneself could help reduce our empathy with them and thus make 
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attempts to eliminate them easier. Just as terrorists denigrate their enemies, perhaps some of 
those who write on terrorism are following a similar pattern through their assumptions.  
 
Terrorism has been used by many different groups, in many different contexts, and for many 
different reasons. A parsimonious and all-inclusive theory of terrorism causation is therefore 
not possible. Structural causes, which emphasise the importance of large-scale factors such as 
political exclusion, oppression and deprivation, highlight the fact that terrorism is a tactic 
used by certain groups who wish to bring about a change in society. Such explanations are, 
however, limited by the fact that very few individuals affected by these social conditions will 
actually engage in terrorism. This has led some to suggest that the ‘terrorist’ must therefore 
have a special psychology or mindset that predisposes them toward terroristic violence.  
The individual psychology approach to terrorism causation research has, however, 
been dogged by a dearth of corroborating evidence, especially research with scientific 
methodology. Furthermore, such an approach may be highly biased in its assumptions and 
suffers from major conceptual flaws. In order to overcome the problems seen in much 
existing terrorist psychology research, it is important to place the individual terrorist in 
context. Any potential terrorist is embedded in interpersonal, group and cultural systems, 
which affect the development of the individual’s beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. As 
Crenshaw (1990) points out: 
“Terrorism is not... the act of an individual. Acts of terrorism are committed by 
groups who reach collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs... It is a 
political act performed by individuals acting together and collectively trying to justify 
their behaviour” (ibid, p.250) 
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In seeking to understand the psychological roots of terrorism, it may therefore be more 
fruitful to examine the interactive processes between the individual and their environment. 
The following chapter will therefore examine theories regarding how such interactions may 
act to radicalise the individual’s political or religious attitudes and cause them to join violent 
political groups.  
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Chapter 2. Individual radicalisation and joining ‘terrorist’ groups 
 
Attempts to explain terrorism solely in terms of static personality factors and individual 
abnormality are both methodologically and conceptually flawed. This has caused some to 
propose that terrorists are ‘made, not born’. As terrorism is used by diverse groups, consisting 
of varied individuals, and in many different contexts, it would be foolish to suggest that there 
is one environmental factor or experience that is common to all potential terrorists. As found 
in the previous chapter, not all terrorists have a history of failure, parental conflict or 
deprivation. Thus looking at static environmental factors cannot explain why ‘normal’ 
individuals become terrorists. 
 It is therefore more likely that becoming a terrorist is the result of long-term, 
interactive processes (Horgan, 2005). Terrorism is largely committed by groups with a 
political and/or religious agenda, and individuals are unlikely to join (or be recruited) into 
these groups unless they support the group’s goals. This chapter will therefore examine a 
number of potential processes underlying two major steps in the individual’s involvement in 
terrorism; the acceptance of a radicalised/extreme political opinion, and joining a violent 
political group. The possible influence of brainwashing, contagion through the media and 
socialisation processes will be assessed, along with the supporting evidence for each. This 
should give some insight into how individuals become radicalised and join groups that may 
use terrorism.  
 
Perhaps the most popular explanation of why individuals, predominantly young males, get 
drawn into terrorist groups is ‘brainwashing’. Brainwashing refers to attempts to change a 
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person’s beliefs, attitudes or values by coercive techniques (Lifton, 1967). The term was first 
used in reference to ‘thought reform’ techniques by Communists in China seeking to force 
political prisoners, students and even foreign citizens to accept their ideology (Taylor, 2005). 
More recently, religious cults have been accused of indoctrinating individuals by coercive 
manipulation (Robbins & Anthony, 1982); perhaps explaining why members of some cults 
accept extreme action such as suicide
10
. 
 Taylor (2005) outlines the process of ‘brainwashing’. Firstly, the brainwasher, who 
seeks to make an individual think and act against their existing beliefs, must exert 
considerable control over their ‘victim’. The individual must be isolated from any people or 
messages that support their existing beliefs and contradict the ‘new’ ones; requiring the 
brainwasher to tightly control the environment and communications. The brainwasher must 
also directly (and repeatedly) challenge the victim’s existing beliefs directly in order to create 
stressful uncertainty (or ‘cognitive dissonance’). This uncertainty, combined with the 
brainwasher’s “authority and expertise” (ibid.) and the new all-encompassing, totalist 
ideology makes the new beliefs more attractive to the victim. Cases of brainwashing have 
also included coercive techniques such as sleep deprivation and humiliation in order to 
increase the victim’s stress, and presumably therefore make them more ‘malleable’. Such 
‘thought-reform’ has, according to some, proved effective in making individuals accept a new 
doctrine as their own. 
In some cases, ‘brainwashing’ religious cults have used terrorism. The Aum 
Shinrikyo cult, for example, held “a considerable degree of totalism in dominating the lives 
of its membership” (Metraux, 1995:1142), including restricting members’ contact with 
outsiders, depriving them of food and sleep, and constant exposure to its totalistic ideology. 
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 E.g. the 909 members of the ‘Peoples Temple’ cult who all committed suicide in the 1978 Jonestown 
Massacre. 
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This apparent ‘brainwashing’ perhaps explains why members committed a number of 
terrorist attacks, including the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo Subway in 1995. It is plausible 
that other terrorist organisations may also brainwash individuals into accepting their beliefs 
and joining their groups. Hudson (1999), for example, posits that terrorist organisations 
operate in a way that is “similar to sects or cults” and “attempt to brainwash individual 
members with their particular ideology” (Hudson, 1999: 35) in order to radicalise individuals 
and turn them into terrorists. The Turkish government, for example, maintains that the PKK
11
 
“recruits its guerrillas forcibly and then subjects them to “brainwashing” sessions at training 
camps” (Hudson, 1999:86). Brainwashing may therefore be the main recruitment tool for 
some terrorist groups. 
 In practice, however, there are a number of reasons to doubt that brainwashing plays a 
significant role in pushing people towards radical political ideology and joining violent 
political groups. As mentioned above, traditional brainwashing requires two main factors; a 
highly controlled environment and coercion. Despite Hudson’s example, there seem to be few 
instances of individuals being forcefully made to join terrorist groups. Furthermore, though 
terrorists groups are clandestine and the members’ environments are tightly controlled 
(White, 2006), the process of accepting the group’s radical ideologies appears to begin before 
they enter such this environment (as will be seen below). This has led many to reject the 
brainwashing explanation. In his review of the profiles of suicide bombers from 1980-2003, 
Robert Pape concluded that: 
 
                                                          
11
 The ‘Kurdistan Workers Party’, a Marxist-Leninist nationalist group seeking an independent Kurdish state. 
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“...suicide terrorists are not primarily from religious cults whose members are 
uneducated, isolated from society, and easily brainwashed into pursuing delusional 
aspirations.” (Pape, 2005:200). 
 
 Some have even suggested that the idea of brainwashing is a ‘myth’. Marc Sageman 
argues that there is no scientific evidence to prove that brainwashing exists, and that 
‘brainwashing’ instead “refers to the process of adopting an ideology that the labeller rejects” 
(Sageman, 2008:50). Consequently, like ‘terrorism’, the term ‘brainwashing’ may be a 
politicised one. It is difficult to understand why someone would choose a different ideology 
from the one that we select for ourselves. Seeing those who do this as being victims of an 
immoral and planned external force is to some extent comforting to the collective ego, as it 
avoids the possibility that a self-determined person could choose an ideology that directly 
opposes our own. The ‘loaded’ nature of the term is perhaps demonstrated by the fact that 
both sides in conflicts involving terrorism often accuse each other of brainwashing. For 
example, al Qaeda have often been accused of brainwashing young Muslims (Sunday 
Morning Herald, 2004), and al Qaeda themselves have accused Western media of 
brainwashing their publics in order to denigrate Muslims (Michael, 2008). Those on both 
sides of the conflict therefore reject the idea that individuals would consciously choose to 
oppose them without external coercion.  
 A brainwashing explanation of why individuals radicalise and join terrorist groups has 
therefore been excluded; there is little evidence that terrorists have simply been forced 
against their will to obey the orders of a leader. This is not to say, however, that outside 
influences are unimportant. Terrorism does not occur in a vacuum; the prospective terrorist 
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must come into contact with radical messages and information, which comes from their 
environment.  
 
A different potential effect linking external information and individual radicalisation is the 
‘contagion effect’, which refers the potential spread of terrorism via media coverage (Martin, 
2006). Contagion theory posits that, when terrorists receive publicity through media channels, 
their actions may be ‘glorified’, thus leading others to emulate this behaviour. Terrorism 
therefore spreads like a disease; exposure to terrorism is enough to push individuals towards 
terrorism. 
This theory is, in part, based on psychological studies into the association between 
television violence and violent behaviour in the viewer (Marsden & Attia, 2005), in which a 
number of researchers have found a significant link between these two variables (e.g. 
Anderson et al, 2003). In such studies the media violence is thought to have its effect by 
providing individuals with scripts and cognitions supporting violence, as well as by triggering 
an “automatic tendency to imitate observed behaviours” (Anderson et al, 2003:81) and 
desensitising individuals to violence. In terms of terrorism, this may translate to providing 
methods for terrorism and cognitions supporting terroristic action
12
. Exposure to terroristic 
violence in the media may therefore cause individuals to consider terrorism a viable and 
justifiable way to achieve their goals, and so they may potentially seek to join a terrorist 
group. 
There is some correlational evidence to support the ‘contagion’ theory of terrorism. 
Martin (2006) points out that there have been ‘cycles’ of similar terrorist attacks, including 
the spread of airplane hijackings in the 1970s-1980s and left-wing terrorism in Europe in the 
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 E.g. cognitions that terrorism is justifiable and is a viable method for meeting one’s goals.  
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1960s-1980s. For many, these patterns of similar attacks are due to the media; individuals 
witness such attacks through the media, which in turn causes them to support the ‘glorified’ 
terrorist groups, perhaps to the extent that they may come to believe terrorism is justifiable, 
and that they too want to join these groups in their struggles.  
This theory has in fact been quite influential; many have suggested that there should 
be either tight controls or an outright ban on media coverage of terrorism, for fear of giving 
the terrorists a voice and thus convincing others to join their cause. Margaret Thatcher, for 
example, famously remarked that nations should “try to find ways to starve the terrorist and 
the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend” (Thatcher, 1985, as quoted in 
Preston, 2004). Others, however, have argued that this theory is overly simplistic. Firstly, the 
psychological research into media violence and violent behaviour is not conclusive; experts 
still debate the association (Picard, 1991)
13
. Furthermore, this research base largely regards 
indiscriminate individual aggression rather than specific, goal-directed violence such as 
terrorism. It is not unreasonable to assume that the process behind a terrorist attack (e.g. 
planning the attack, making a bomb and planting it) is a more conscious process than the 
socially learned, disinhibited behaviour of a generally ‘violent’ person. Consequently, 
making firm conclusions about the spread of terrorism based on generalisations from this 
research is perhaps unwise. 
Robert Picard is perhaps most vocal in his criticism of contagion theory, stating that 
the literature behind it consists largely of:  
 
                                                          
13
 There is no definite causal relationship between media violence and aggressive behaviour; though people 
could be learning violence from the media, it is also possible that inherently violent people seek out violent 
media. 
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“...sweeping generalities, conjecture, supposition, anecdotal evidence based on 
dubious correlations, and endless repetition of equally weak arguments and non-
scientific evidence offered by other writers on the subject of terrorism” 
(Picard,1991:40).  
 
Though this is strongly put, Picard’s points are important; there is little direct evidence 
linking media coverage and the individual radicalisation or terrorist group recruitment or 
formation. The cycles observed by Martin (2006), for example, could easily be explained by 
other factors such as direct cooperation and communication between groups.  
The only conclusive result of exposure to terrorism through the media is knowledge 
of terrorism’s existence and the goals of those who perpetrate it. Upon viewing terrorism, 
most individuals react negatively; expressing anger at the perpetrators. Those who do have a 
pre-existing sympathy towards the perpetrators may simply be made more aware of the 
existence of terrorist organisations and their goals; there is no conclusive evidence to suggest 
that this will lead to radicalisation of their attitudes, or their joining or forming terrorist 
groups.  
 
Understanding the process of political socialisation may instead help to explain why 
individuals adopt radical, absolutist political frameworks, and why they in turn seek to join 
violent political groups.  Socialisation is the process by which individuals learn culturally-
specific attitudes, beliefs and values from others in their social networks. Such an approach 
therefore emphasises the interactions between the individual and the social networks in which 
they are embedded.  
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Media may play a role in socialisation, in that political messages received through the 
media may promote certain political attitudes; however the wide coverage of media means 
that such socialisation cannot explain why only certain individuals in a society or culture turn 
to terrorist. Commenting on left-wing militants in Europe in the 1970s-1980s, della Porta 
pointed out; 
 
“...membership in the political counterculture was in no way typical of those who later 
joined the underground. To the opposite, radical groups were only small minorities of 
mass movements” (della Porta, 1992:272).  
 
The same is true of most terrorist organisations and the social movements that surround them; 
many people may hold similar attitudes or beliefs to those who commit terrorism, however 
only a small fraction of these will become actively involved in violent protest. Instead, the 
socialising effects of the interpersonal networks in which a prospective terrorist is embedded 
may better explain why specific individuals adopt radical ideologies. If an individual’s family 
and friends hold highly radicalised political attitudes, and beliefs that political violence is 
justifiable, then these may be transferred to the individual. 
One major channel for socialisation is an individual’s parents; they are a source of a 
large proportion of a person’s beliefs, attitudes and values. This influence also spreads to 
political and religious socialisation; children often support the same political party as their 
parents or practice the same religious beliefs. This association is supported by a large body of 
research. For example, on the basis of a longitudinal socialisation survey, Glass, Bengston 
and Dunham (1986) concluded that parental religious and political attitudes “exert an 
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influence independent of social status inheritance, and that these effects, though diminished, 
exist past early adulthood” (ibid, p.696). 
Could it therefore be that the radical ideologies seen in those who engage in terrorism 
come from their parents? Perhaps counter-intuitively, there actually appears to be little 
evidence for this. There are no large-scale surveys to suggest that terrorists tend to come from 
families with histories of radical political opinions. Instead, in most cases parents appear to 
show shock and surprise at the terroristic actions of their offspring. A good example is 
provided by the parents of the 7/7 London bombers. They all expressed their disbelief and 
shock at the actions of their children (Rai, 2006), and none held fundamentalist Islamic 
beliefs. Indeed one of the bombers, Abdullah Jamal (born Germaine Lindsay), was born into 
a Christian family and converted to Islam at the age of 15. 
There are some exceptions to this, however. Marc Sageman (2008) points out that, in 
his database of individuals who joined the global Islamist terrorist movement, approximately 
a fifth of the sample were close relatives, including sons, of existing members. Such cases 
are, however in the minority. Though parents can be responsible for the radicalisation of their 
children it does not appear to be the typical pattern. 
Socialisation via other individuals, such as friends, peers and teachers may be more 
important in terms of the acceptance of radical ideologies. A number of studies have 
demonstrated that individual attitudes often correlate with those of their peers at schools, 
colleges and universities. Alwin, Cohen and Newcomb (1991), for example, followed a 
number of women from conservative homes who went to study at a liberal college. They 
found that instead of persisting with the conservative political attitudes of their parents, these 
women became liberalised. Furthermore this effect often lasted into adulthood, with the new 
liberal political beliefs often persisting to a follow-up nearly 50 years later.  
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For individuals who later become terrorists, it may therefore be socialisation from 
peers and teachers (including religious preachers, political activists etcetera with whom the 
individual has frequent interactions) that causes them to adopt extreme political or religious 
attitudes and beliefs. Many terrorism researchers have suggested that peer influences are 
important. Again on the basis of her studies of Italian left-wing terrorists, della Porta 
indicates that “the decision to join an underground organization was very rarely an individual 
one. In most cases, it involved a clique of friends” (della Porta, 1992:273). She points out that 
the majority of recruits (74%) actually had more than one new friend in the organisation, and 
many (42%) had more than seven. Interpersonal relationships with peers appears to have had 
a significant impact on individuals’ decision to join the violent groups.  
Sageman (2008) discovered a similar pattern in his database of Islamic terrorists. His 
data showed that approximately two thirds of his sample were “friends with other people who 
joined together or already had some connection to terrorism” (Sageman, 2008:66). 
Furthermore, many of the terrorists he studied joined through meeting up with childhood 
friends when emigrating to the West; as “if a former friend is part of a terrorist group, a 
latecomer will start to socialise with him, and soon his entire social circle will be people 
involved in terrorism” (Sageman, 2008:67). Again it would appear that socialisation by 
friends and close peers is important in the process of radicalisation.  
Levine and Moreland (1994) describe a theory of socialisation that may explain why 
individuals come to accept the attitudes and beliefs of their peers and consequently join 
associated groups
14
. This model outlines three psychological processes involved in 
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 This theory “assumes that the relationship between the group and the individual changes in systematic ways 
over time and views both parties as potential influence agents” (Levine & Moreland, 1994:306). Radicalisation 
and joining terrorist groups can be modelled as a transactional process rather than an aggregation of non-
dynamic factors.  
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socialisation; evaluation, commitment and role transition. Once an individual comes into 
contact with a particular group (through peers) they will proceed through these processes.  
  Evaluation involves “assessments of the rewardingness of relationships” (Levine & 
Moreland, 1994:308). As groups have goals that they want to accomplish, they will evaluate 
prospective members in terms of whether they will aid the attainment of these goals. 
Similarly, the individual will evaluate the group in terms of whether they can help him/her to 
attain their own personal goals. For terrorist groups their goals may be to gain political 
representation, to overthrow a government or to attain some other ideologically-motivated 
achievement, and thus they will evaluate individuals in terms of whether they will further the 
cause. They will perhaps recruit those with practical skills or simply those with a compatible 
ideology. A report by the RAND corporation (Gerwehr & Daly, 2006), for example, found 
that al-Qaeda tends to target for recruitment those with high levels of dissatisfaction, cultural 
disillusionment and a compatible belief/value system.  
 There are a number of goals which membership of a violent political group may be 
able to fulfil for the potential terrorist. According to Schwartz’ (1973) theory of political 
alienation, those individuals who value political efficacy (i.e. the ability to have some impact 
on the decisions of the polity) but feel they have little, will seek to increase their efficacy. 
Consequently, if they perceive the extremist political group as being able to provide them 
with political efficacy, they may seek to join
15
.  
Membership of such groups may also provide a way to achieve ‘identity’ goals. 
According to Social Identity Theory (SIT), social identity (the part of one’s self-image gained 
from membership of cultural and social groups) is an important source of self-esteem (Tajfel 
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 This is supported by the suggestion that terrorists often come from the elites of society. If individuals feel that 
they should, due to their relatively well-off status, have a greater impact on the polity, and yet feel that they are 
inhibited from doing so, they may believe that violent group membership would be empowering. 
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& Turner, 1986)
16
. Thus individuals strive to have membership in positively-valued groups. 
If an individual therefore desires positive social identity, they may desire to join a violent 
political group; the heroic identity of ‘freedom fighter’ is strong is such groups.  
Furthermore, many potential terrorists appear to have experienced conflicting 
identities. Clark (1983, as cited in Post, 2007) surveyed ETA members, and found that 
approximately 40% had one Spanish and one Basque parent; again suggesting conflicting 
identity. Similarly, the 7/7 London bombers may have encountered conflict between Islamic 
identity and modern Western identity (Rai, 2006).  Individuals experiencing identity conflict 
may seek to join groups that could help them reduce value conflict by providing them with a 
single, totalistic, and positive identity. The strong, positive ‘freedom fighter’ identity 
associated with membership in violent political groups may therefore attract such individuals. 
 The commitment process entails both the individual and the group making evaluations 
of the “past, present, and future rewardingness” (Levine & Moreland, 1994:308) of their 
relationship according to their goals. If the group and individual remember their relationship 
to have been beneficial in the past and expect this to continue in the future, then the 
commitment between them will be higher. This is important in socialisation, as feelings of 
commitment increase the likelihood that the individual will; 
 
“...accept the group’s goals and values, feel positive affect toward group members, 
work hard to fulfil group expectations and attain group goals, and seek to gain or 
maintain membership in the group.” (ibid.)  
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 This theory will be discussed in more depth in chapter 3. 
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Thus individuals who believe membership of a violent political group will be rewarding will 
assimilate the group’s radical attitudes and beliefs. 
 The final process is role transition. This is where a decision is reached to relabel or 
reclassify the relationship, including entry into the group and acceptance by the group
17
. This 
can include rites of passage “designed to clarify that an important change has taken place” 
(Levine & Moreland, 1994:309). Such ceremonies can be observed in terrorist groups; Sosis 
and Alcorta (2008:5) point out that “secular and religious terrorists alike maintain communal 
rituals and initiation rites that communicate an individual’s level of commitment to the 
group.” 
Levine and Moreland (1994) describe how these processes act in the initial stages of 
joining a group. Firstly, at the investigation stage, the individual is looking for groups that 
match his/her needs and the group is similarly seeking members to help them reach their 
goals. Once this occurs commitment may build between them until it meets an ‘acceptance 
criteria’, at which point the individual goes through the ‘entry’ role transition and becomes a 
member of the group. Secondly, at the socialization stage, the group influences the 
individual’s values, beliefs and goals, and thus the individual is ‘assimilated’ into the group’s 
ethos
18
. Again, once commitment has risen to a sufficient level, the individual goes through 
another role transition to ‘acceptance’ by the group.  
 It is easy to see how this model can apply to terrorist groups. If individuals feel that 
violent political groups may help them meet their own needs and the groups calculate that 
that individual may help them to further their cause, then the individual will be permitted 
entry once they meet a certain level of commitment. The process then continues with 
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 Levine & Moreland’s (1994) model in fact covers the individual’s entire progress through the group, from 
entry to eventual exit. As this discussion only covers the entry of people to terrorist groups, only the first stages 
are mentioned here.  
18
 The individual can also, to some extent, influence the group’s goals and values; both new member and group 
must accommodate the other.  
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commitment building up between individual and group. The individual assimilates the 
group’s radical and absolutist ideology, beliefs in violence as a justifiable recourse, and a 
desire to actively pursue the group’s goals.  
 Levine and Moreland’s (1994) model has been supported by studies into individuals 
joining non-terrorist groups such as student organisations at college. Direct research into 
these processes in violent political groups is, however, difficult to achieve. Despite calls for 
“applied research that focuses on the socialization process in terrorist groups” (Moreland, 
2006) there has been little (if any) such research to date.  
This model obviously cannot by itself explain why individuals join such groups; 
perceptions of the political, social and economic climate must also play a part. If the 
individual does not deem the society to need changing, they are unlikely to seek membership 
in groups that seek to change it by force.  It is important to bear the wider context in mind 
when considering whether an individual will seek to join a radical political group. 
Nevertheless, aspects of the model can be easily inferred across to the process of individual 
socialisation into extremist political ideologies. Thus it may act as a useful model for 
explaining how and why individuals accept extreme political ideologies and join violent 
groups.  
  
The processes underlying individual radicalisation and transition into groups that use 
terrorism are extremely complex. Every potential terrorist treads their own path, and is 
influenced by many different environmental factors and life events. There may, however, be 
some commonalities in the social psychological processes that underlie the joining of terrorist 
groups. 
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 Brainwashing is often advanced as an explanation of why individuals join terrorist 
group. Nevertheless there is little evidence that the majority of potential terrorists are coerced 
into accepting a new set of radical beliefs. In reality, ‘brainwashing’ is a politicised term, 
which is often used as an explanation for why individuals may chose ideology that 
contradicts one’s own. Contagion theory is equally problematic. There is little systematic 
evidence to suggest that simply viewing terrorism will cause individuals to adopt radical 
ideology, and ‘patterns’ in terrorism can be explained by cooperation between groups. It 
would therefore seem that media exposure can perhaps describe the spread of information 
regarding terrorism, but not why some individuals come to accept extremist ideologies. 
 Socialisation research, from the social psychology literature, may provide the best 
explanation for this discussion. It is well established that interpersonal relationships are an 
important source of individuals’ political and religious beliefs and values. There is evidence 
that peers, teachers and the like may be responsible for the radicalisation of individuals’ 
ideologies and their inclusion in violent groups. Levine and Moreland’s (1994) model of 
socialisation describes this process; individuals seek membership in groups which may help 
them to achieve their own goals, and their increasing commitment to these groups causes the 
individual to integrate the group’s beliefs and values. Unfortunately, this theory has not been 
directly tested in the context of terrorism, and such research would be difficult. Nevertheless, 
it is a good conceptual fit, and may serve as a useful model for describing individuals’ 
movement toward terrorism.   
 Up to this point, no mention has been made of individuals’ active involvement in 
terroristic violence. This is because the decision to use such tactics is assumed to be a group 
one. The following chapter will therefore explore the group-level processes leading political 
groups to engage with terrorism. 
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Chapter 3. The group’s engagement in terrorism 
 
In the previous chapter, how some individuals come to join radical and potentially violent 
political groups was examined. As the majority of terrorism is committed by such groups, the 
group context is perhaps the best level at which to understand the processes behind the use of 
terrorism. As Crenshaw (1990:251) argues; “the group may be more important than the 
individual to the initiation and conduct of campaigns of terrorism... As the group is formed, a 
collective mind-set emerges.” It is the interactions between members of violent political 
groups that therefore determine their decision to use terrorism. Consequently, this chapter 
will explore how well-known phenomena in group psychology (obedience, groupthink, group 
polarisation and social identity processes) can help us understand why such groups come to 
engage in terrorism. The theories presented will be described, and their applicability and 
supporting research will be evaluated, in order to assess how useful such explanations can be 
in describing the origins of terrorism. 
Political groups are complex; consisting of different interacting individuals tied into 
systems of norms, rules and beliefs. Some groups have an obvious hierarchical structure, like 
an organised army, whereas others are less rigidly structured. Furthermore, groups vary 
considerably in their size, dispersion and ideologies (White, 2006), perhaps presenting 
significant difficulties for the generalisability of group-psychology theories of terrorism. 
Nevertheless, there are significant commonalities between such groups too, meaning that 
these theories can still provide useful explanations for terrorism. Where variance in group 
make-up has an important impact on the dynamics under discussion, it will be explored.            
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In any social group with a hierarchical structure, norms and rules demand that individuals 
obey the orders of those who hold legitimate authority (Taylor et al, 2003). Just as soldiers in 
an army follow the commands of their superiors, perhaps members of violent political groups 
are simply obeying leaders who have made a tactical decision to use terrorism. 
Obedience is a well-studied phenomenon in psychology. Stanley Milgram’s (1965) 
experiment famously demonstrated the power of authority over people’s actions. In his study, 
subjects were asked to give increasing electric shocks to another individual (actually a 
confederate of the experimenter) whenever they gave an incorrect answer to a question on a 
learning test. Though the learning test was a cover, and there were in fact no electric shocks, 
the confederate complained each time a ‘shock’ was administered, eventually shouting with 
pain and finally falling silent. The presence of an authority (the experimenter who urged them 
to continue) led most participants to continue giving the shocks even up to lethally high 
voltages. 
This obedience effect has proved durable across different contexts and situations, and 
over many repetitions of the study. As Milgram himself put it;  
 
“Men who are in everyday life responsible and decent were seduced by the trappings 
of authority... and by the uncritical acceptance of the experimenter’s definition of the 
situation into performing harsh acts” (Milgram, 1965:74). 
 
He therefore demonstrated that the presence of an authority figure can cause individuals to 
take actions that they would otherwise find morally unacceptable. He ascribed this effect to 
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individuals entering an ‘agentic state’ whereby “they suspend their own judgment and cede 
responsibility for their actions to those in charge.” (Haslam & Reichter, 2007:616). 
Caildini (2001) explains this facet of human behaviour in terms of cultural systems 
and childhood development: 
 
 “...we are trained from birth to believe that obedience to proper authority is 
right and disobedience is wrong. This message fills the parental lessons, the 
schoolhouse rhymes, stories, and songs of our childhood and is carried forward in the 
legal, military, and political systems we encounter as adults.” (ibid. p.185). 
 
People are therefore subject to social and cultural programming that makes them comply with 
norms and rules regarding social hierarchy. This suggests that there is no ‘obedient’ 
personality type (Milgram found obedience from all subjects); all people have the inbuilt 
tendency to defer to authority figures deemed legitimate by the social or cultural group.  
 The application of this research to political violence is perhaps obvious. There are 
many cases of those who have committed violent atrocities attempting to deny accountability 
for their actions by arguing that their crimes were simply the result of following orders; so 
called crimes of obedience (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). Milgram’s findings have been used 
to explain why ordinary German citizens may have become involved in the genocidal 
campaigns of the Nazis. Soldiers, police and even concentration camp guards may simply 
have been deferring to authority, on the basis of social and cultural rules and norms that 
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demand obedience to legitimate superiors
19
. Blind obedience to authority has since been 
blamed for many cases of extreme violence by groups, including the Mai Lai massacre
20
 
(Bandura, 2004) and the Soviet purges (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). 
If some shockingly violent and even genocidal behaviour can be explained by natural 
deference to authority, then perhaps terrorism is also a ‘crime of obedience’. Once 
individuals have developed a radicalised ideology and accepted membership of a political 
group, both their own social learning and the norms and rules of the group will act to force 
them to defer to the control of group leaders. If these leaders decide to use terrorism in 
support of the group’s cause, they will order subordinates to carry out their plans. The leaders 
will be seen as legitimate authority by these members, as their position is upheld by the 
shared beliefs, values and norms of the group. Furthermore, unlike in Milgram’s studies, 
these individuals are actually supportive of the aims of their leaders due to shared goals and 
ideology. This means that, though they might in other contexts avoid such violence, here 
ideology and leadership can interact to make the individual not only carry out terrorism, but 
also to believe it justifiable.  
There is plenty of evidence that many terrorist groups demand obedience to the 
leadership. The Provisional IRA’s Green Book (a training manual for new volunteers) 
demands that:  
 
                                                          
19
 A number of defendants at the Nuremberg trials attempted, unsuccessfully, to claim that they were simply 
‘following orders’. These individuals were, however, high up in the German hierarchy (i.e. they were the 
authority figures themselves, giving orders and making tactical decisions) and thus Milgram’s evidence on 
obedience would appear not to apply to them. Such a defence has since become known as the ‘Nuremberg 
defence’. 
20
 Where US soldiers obeyed the orders of their superiors to kill hundreds of unarmed civilians, including 
children, during the Vietnam War.  
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“All recruits, entering the Army declare that they shall obey all orders issued to them 
by their superior officers and by the Army Authority... Orders and instructions 
sometimes may be distasteful to the Volunteer, but this is what is involved in being a 
volunteer.... the ability to take orders and to carry them out to the best of your ability” 
(as quoted in Horgan, 2006:128). 
 
Thus we can see that, in this group, huge pressure is put on a recruit to carry out orders, even 
if they are violent and ‘distasteful’. Volunteers must therefore give up a considerable degree 
of their autonomy to group leaders, and will carry out terrorism if commanded to do so.  Cult-
like organisations such as Aum Shinrikyo are also known to demand blind obedience to 
leaders (Crenshaw, 2000). Crenshaw points out that leaders may even apply coercive 
pressure; threatening punishment in order to ensure that group members comply with orders. 
This pattern would seem to be most applicable to those groups with a rigid 
hierarchical structure (e.g. paramilitaries such as the LTTE or FARC). Some groups follow 
strategies such as ‘leaderless resistance’; “a kind of lone wolf operation in which an 
individual, or a very small, highly cohesive group, engage in acts of anti-state violence 
independent of any movement, leader or network of support” (Kaplan, 1997:80). This 
strategy was popularised among radical right-wing groups in the USA, and Marc Sageman 
(2008) argued that a similar configuration exists in the international Islamic jihadist network. 
Though many people assume that Osama Bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership are 
coordinating and commanding all of the terrorist attacks committed in the name of the global 
Islamist social movement, in actual fact many (if not most) of these attacks, such as the 2004 
Madrid bombing 7/7 London bombings, are committed by “informal groups of wannabes, 
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copycats [and] homegrown initiates” (Sageman, 2008:31) who make up a global social 
movement. 
Some groups using terrorism do not therefore have a straightforward leader-
subordinate structure. This means that simple obedience to the tactical decisions of authority 
figures cannot be solely responsible for the use of terrorism by all groups. Whereas 
Milgram’s research remains a useful explanation of why members of military-type 
organisations may carry out terroristic violence, members of ‘leaderless’ groups may instead 
be motivated to carry out such actions because of conformity and compliance to decisions 
made by the group as a whole. It is therefore important to attempt to understand how groups 
may come to decide that terrorism is a valid course of action.  
 
Violent political groups are purposeful actors, and as such the actions that they take are the 
result of decisions aimed at reaching group goals. This means that “the launching of terrorism 
on the part of some perpetrators requires a deliberate decision; rooted in the belief that 
spreading fear in a target population will advance their objectives” (Kruglanski & Fishman, 
2006:204). The killing of civilians would appear, to many, to be irrational, and yet terrorists 
themselves (as seen in Chapter 1) are generally normal individuals
21. A ‘deliberate decision’ 
is not necessarily, however, a rational one. Defects in the decision-making process itself may 
instead be responsible for these groups engaging with terrorism.  
Groupthink theory, developed by Irving Janis (1982), is one of the most famous 
attempts to explain how ‘faulty’ decision-making in groups can lead to the adoption of risky 
or unwise courses of action in groups. The term ‘groupthink’ refers to; 
 
                                                          
21
 Albeit, individuals with radicalised political or religious beliefs and values. 
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“...a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a 
cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (Janis, 1982:9) 
 
Defective decision-making in groups can therefore lead groups to fail to examine the risks 
associated with, and alternatives to, a chosen course of action. Furthermore, groups suffering 
groupthink often fail to make contingency plans and show biases in information selection (i.e. 
only looking at information that supports their decision) and processing (i.e. interpreting 
information as supportive of their decisions even when it is not). 
From case studies of policy decision-making ‘fiascos’ such as the Bay of Pigs and 
Watergate, Irving developed a general model of groupthink in an attempt to explain under 
what conditions a group may be at risk. Firstly, highly cohesive groups, where members 
share common beliefs and norms, value membership of the group, and have strong 
interpersonal ties, are at increased risk of groupthink. This is probably because in such groups 
individuals desire to be liked and accepted by the group. This can lead members to self-
censor any dissent that they may have to the group opinion, meaning that counterpoints to 
arguments (and thus perceived problems with the group’s decisions for action) will not be 
aired or considered.  
 Furthermore, insularity, homogeneity of members and a lack of impartial leadership 
can also predispose a group toward groupthink. Again, this is because dissent and opposing 
viewpoints will not be heard in the group’s deliberations. Insularity means that external 
information that may suggest that a certain course of action is risky or unpopular outside of 
the group is not heard or accepted. Additionally, when groups have members of very similar 
background or ideology (i.e. homogenous groups), the members are less likely to be able to 
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bring different points of view to discussions that may again counterpoint the group’s position. 
Finally, if leaders favour a certain course of action, they may discount or exclude the 
opinions of members who disagree with them. This is especially true when the group is under 
stress from external threat, when members may look for the guidance of leaders. 
 Janis (1982) also outlines a number of ‘symptoms’ of groupthink that may help to 
indicate situations where groupthink has occurred. These symptoms include the illusion of 
invulnerability and unanimity in the group, a belief that the group’s position is a just and 
moral one, the emergence of censorship (e.g. ‘mindguards’ who suppress dissention among 
members), and heavy pressures toward unanimity. He also suggests that groups encountering 
groupthink may stereotype members of any opposing outgroups. All of these act to enhance 
the group’s confidence in its own decisions, making them complacent about the possibility 
that their decisions could be poor ones. 
As mentioned above, Janis (1982) evidences his groupthink theory in relation to 
policy decision-making by governments. Others have continued this work, for example 
applying groupthink concepts to the decision-making behind the War on Terrorism 
(McConville, 2003) and the 1991 Gulf War (Yetiv, 2003). Though there has so far been little 
application of groupthink theory to terrorism, some have suggested that it “could be argued 
that the symptoms and decision-making characteristics that typify groupthink are present in 
terrorist organisations” (Copland, 2005:32). Terrorist groups do appear to share many of the 
predisposing factors outlined by Janis. Such groups are highly cohesive and insular, as 
necessitated by their clandestine nature and strong conformity pressures. Furthermore, they 
are normally highly homogenous; tending to consist of young males from similar 
backgrounds and sharing a single ideology (Hudson, 1999). Terrorist groups also have strong 
conformity pressures due to the strong norms regarding behaviour and thought (Taylor and 
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Lewis, 2004) which may lead individuals to self-censor objections to decisions. These factors 
together mean that groupthink is, according to Janis’ theory, highly likely in such groups.  
The symptoms of groupthink are perhaps also easy to discern in the radical political 
groups that engage in terrorism. They often claim ultimate morality, perceiving themselves to 
be backed by god or a political ideology that is just and fair. Furthermore, members of such 
group see their terroristic actions as justifiable even in the face of negative public opinion, 
and often see terrorism as the ‘only way’ to achieve their goals (Copland, 2005). What is 
more, compliance with group decisions is not simply a result of conformity norms; dissenters 
and deviants may well be punished (a la Janis’ ‘mindguards’). Hudson (1999) provides a 
good example of this: 
 
“In 1972, when half of the 30-member Rengo Sekigun (Red Army) terrorist group, 
which became known as the JRA, objected to the group’s strategy, the dissenters ... were tied 
to stakes in the northern mountains of Japan, whipped with wires, and left to die of 
exposure.” (ibid. p.37) 
 
Groupthink theory could therefore explain why political groups with a radical 
ideology may turn to terrorism. If such a group suffers from groupthink when deliberating on 
what course of action to take to achieve their goals, then they may not consider alternative 
courses of action or opposing viewpoints and opinion (from both within and outside the 
group) that may suggest that terrorism is an unwise, unpopular and risky choice. This could 
therefore lead to an uncritical adoption of terroristic action as a result of faulty decision-
making. Furthermore, this theory is generalisable across different types of group; in a 
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hierarchical group groupthink may occur in the deliberations of the top leadership, and in 
smaller or less structured groups it may occur in the decisions of the group as a whole. 
This theory does, to some extent, contradict the assertion by some researchers that 
terrorism is a rational response to environmental pressures such as political exclusion or 
oppression. Martha Crenshaw, for example, argues that “campaigns of terrorism depend on 
rational political choice” because “terrorist organizations possess internally consistent sets of 
values, beliefs, and images of the environment” (Crenshaw, 1981:385). She therefore 
suggests that the beliefs and ideologies of groups, and their perceptions of the world, are what 
drive groups towards terrorism. Groupthink, however, suggests that it is the social dynamics 
of the group that drives terrorism. Obviously the group will use its beliefs and values to 
rationalise the choice of action it makes, however ideologies could potentially support many 
different types of action other than terroristic violence in reaction to perceived injustices. 
Thus groupthink theory does not envision terrorist ‘irrationality’ as a property of being a 
terrorist, but rather a property of group dynamics exhibited by many groups including 
terrorist groups. 
There are, however, a number of problems with groupthink theory. Most notably the 
supporting evidence does not stretch much beyond subjective and anecdotal case studies. 
This is largely due to the nature of the groupthink concept; it is complex and multifaceted, 
making it difficult to test scientifically. In a review of groupthink research, Turner and 
Pratkanis (1998) indicated that a number of studies had tried and failed to find evidence for 
Janis’ ‘predisposing factors’ for groupthink under laboratory conditions. For example, in a 
laboratory experiment on groups of students, Leana (1985) found no evidence that 
cohesiveness encourages self-censorship
22
. She did find that directive leaders (i.e. leaders 
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 It is worth noting, however, that in such laboratory groups, a major contributor to groupthink, stress from 
external threat, is missing; the true conditions of groupthink may be impossible to replicate experimentally. 
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with an obvious preference for the outcome of the discussion) caused groups to discuss fewer 
alternatives than leaders who encouraged free discussion. This may suggest that poor group 
decision making may be more down to faulty leadership than group dynamics.  
As noted above, there has been little direct application of groupthink theory in the 
terrorism literature. Even if there were significant evidence for the existence of the 
groupthink phenomena, it would therefore be impossible to draw conclusions about its 
relevance to terrorism without further research. This theory may therefore be limited in what 
it can tell us about the decision of some groups to engage in terroristic violence. As Turner 
and Pratkanis (1998:112) point out, “the intuitive appeal of the groupthink concept and the 
seductiveness of its formulation at times can overwhelm the scientific evidence on the topic.” 
The theory is intricate and insightful; however it lacks strong empirical support. Furthermore, 
the lack of direct studies of groupthink in terrorist groups means that its explanatory power 
for terrorism may be limited.  
 
This does not mean that group dynamics are an unproductive field of study for those seeking 
to understand terrorism. Instead, it may be more useful to apply concepts with a more solid 
research base. One well-researched process which may be able to explain the radicalisation of 
members of terrorist groups, and consequently the adoption of extreme courses of action, is 
group polarisation.  
 An unpublished study by Stoner (1961, as cited in Taylor et al, 2003) demonstrated 
that decisions made by groups tended to be more risky than those my by individuals. This 
“sparked considerable interest, in part because it seemed to contradict the popular belief that 
groups are relatively conservative and stodgy about decision making” (Taylor et al, 
2003:315). Further studies found the effect to be two-way; with groups making either more 
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risky or occasionally more conservative decisions than individuals alone. Group polarisation 
therefore refers to this commonly found phenomenon in groups, whereby through discussions 
“groups are prone to make more extreme choices than individual members.” (McDermott, 
2004:257). 
A typical group polarisation experiment involves giving individuals a hypothetical 
scenario and asking them to rate the probability of success that they would accept in a course 
of action (i.e. proceeding with the action only if success is certain to proceeding even if 
success is unlikely). The participants then deliberate in groups, and come to a unanimous 
decision. The numerous examples of such research tend to show that, if individuals tend to 
favour a risky course of action before group discussion, then the group decision will be 
polarised towards risky action (as opposed to the group decision simply being an average of 
the individuals’ opinions) (McDermott, 2004). Conversely, if individuals start favouring a 
conservative course of action, the group decision will be polarised towards conservativism. 
There is also evidence that the effect can polarise attitudes. Moscovi and Zavalloni (1969) 
asked students in France to rate their individual attitudes toward Americans as individuals, 
and then asked them to do the same in groups. They found that their subjects exhibited 
negative attitudes alone, and following the group task their attitudes were polarised, 
becoming more negative. 
This well-supported theory may therefore be applicable to the study of terrorism; 
potentially helping to explain how groups may radicalise together and adopt extreme, violent 
courses of action. Sunstein (2001) advanced the idea that group polarisation dynamics play a 
role in terrorism. He notes that “extremists are especially prone to polarization. When they 
start out an extreme point, they are likely to go much further in that direction with which they 
started” (ibid. p.433). What is more, Sunstein argues that such groups are especially prone to 
this effect because they share strong affective ties, a shared identity, and a high degree of 
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solidarity; three predisposing factors for group polarisation. Thus members of a radical 
political group are at risk of coming to support extreme violent action, including terrorism, 
through the group polarisation process. 
There are a two possible processes underlying group polarisation (Sunstein, 2002). 
One line of reasoning holds that ‘social comparison’ and self-presentation biases is 
responsible for polarisation. This holds that individuals wish to compare favourably to others 
in the group; desiring to look more confident or more determined than others. Thus, when 
they hear the opinions of others, “they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant 
position.” (ibid. p.179). Others then shift themselves too, thus pushing the group decision to 
one extreme through a process of ‘one-upmanship’. In terms of terrorist groups, individual 
members may wish to seem more committed to the cause or to taking action to write 
perceived injustices. This may lead them to claim more extreme attitudes (e.g. claiming 
stronger belief in the ideology or hatred of their enemies) and to suggest increasingly extreme 
courses of action.  
A second possibility is the ‘persuasive arguments’ theory, which posits that 
deliberating in a group where members start with similar opinions exposes the individual to 
more and varied arguments supporting their initial position. If a greater number of supporting 
arguments means greater confidence in one’s own opinions, then each member (and thus the 
group in aggregate) will polarise to a more extreme position (Taylor et al, 2003). Again this is 
plausible for radical political groups; members may each have different reasons for violent 
action (e.g. examples of oppression or violence against the group that require retribution) or 
may have arguments supporting the group’s ideology, which could in turn make others more 
sure of their ideological opinions or more supportive of terroristic violence.  
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The group polarization phenomenon is therefore a plausible explanation for the 
movement of groups toward terrorism. Group polarisation has been widely researched in 
many contexts, and though it has not been directly studied in terrorist groups (such research 
would be extremely difficult), generalisations to terrorism can be made. Polarisation could 
explain the radicalisation of ideology (becoming more fundamental in belief), the 
demonisation of the outgroup ‘enemies’ and the inflation of the group’s own sense of 
morality and justness, and the group’s belief in the need for increasingly extreme action 
including violence against civilians.  
Furthermore, the effect should occur in groups of all different types; leaders and 
followers in hierarchical groups and members of ‘leaderless resistance’ groups should all be 
susceptible to polarisation. Members of wider, more dispersed groups/social movements 
should also be susceptible; the global jihadist network described by Sageman (2008), for 
example, could be polarised though discussions via global communication networks
23
 
Nevertheless, this theory is not definitive. Almost all groups are susceptible to polarisation 
effects, and yet not all will engage in terrorism. Those groups experiencing a greater level of 
environmental pressure, or consisting of individuals who originally favoured more violent 
actions, may be more likely to engage in terrorism. 
 
There may be group psychological processes beyond faulty decision making and polarisation 
driving terrorism. One of the most oft-researched phenomena in social psychology is inter-
group conflict and its origins.  An understanding of the group-psychological factors that drive 
groups to compete with each other and engage in violence against one another may give 
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 Though it has not been widely researched, the internet allows like-minded individuals to engage in discussion 
on a global scale. This could potentially be a new route to polarisation for sympathy groups and social 
movements. 
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important insight into why some groups are motivated to use violence against civilians of 
another group. 
Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) ‘Social Identity Theory’ (SIT) was developed to explain 
intergroup prejudice and discrimination, and as such provides a useful model for competition 
and conflict between groups .Three basic premises underlie this theory; (1) individuals strive 
to achieve self-esteem and positive social identity, (2) social groups and categories
24
 (into 
which individuals categorise the world) are associated with positive or negative evaluations, 
and so one’s own social identity (and thus self-esteem) are determined by the evaluations of 
one’s own groups, and (3) these evaluations are determined by comparisons between one’s 
own ingroup and comparable outgroups
25
, with favourable comparisons creating higher 
prestige for group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 2004).  
Group members are therefore motivated to see their own groups in a favourable light 
because group memberships are integral to the individual’s self-concept. This desire for 
positive distinctiveness from other groups can drive the behaviour of groups. If an ingroup-
outgroup comparison leaves group members with negative social identity (i.e. the outgroup is 
evaluated more favourably), they will take steps to rectify this; either by leaving their current 
group or (if groups boundaries are impermeable because of status differences) attempting to 
make their current group more positively distinct. This is where conflict may come into play; 
a number of strategies may be used to make these ingroup-outgroup comparisons more 
favourable, including competition and aggression (in order to decrease the outgroup’s 
standing) and denigration, prejudice and discrimination (in order to make the outgroup more 
negatively evaluated). 
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 It is worth noting here that ‘groups’ in SIT may refer not only to small groups, but also to larger social 
categories, including religion, ethnicity, political ideology; anything into which individuals may categorise their 
social worlds.  
25
 Comparisons will only be made between the ingroup and relevant outgroups; “similarity, proximity and 
situational salience all play an integral role in determining which groups are comparable” (Arena & Arrigo, 
2006:29). 
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There is plenty of evidence to suggest that these ingroup-outgroup processes produce 
conflict. Even arbitrary groups (i.e. groups composed of randomly-assigned subjects in 
laboratory experiments) show evidence of discrimination and prejudice (e.g. allocating more 
rewards to ingroup members than the outgroup, or denigrating members of the outgroup), 
even where they are not directly interacting with members of their own or the other group 
(Tajfel & Turner, 2004). For those groups with concrete grievances against an outgroup, this 
effect should presumably be stronger. 
Social Identity processes may therefore push groups toward terrorism in a number of 
ways. Firstly, terrorism is often referred to as the ‘weapon of the weak’ (i.e. those with little 
political power and low status), and SIT can explain why ‘the weak’ may engage in violence. 
As Arena and Arrigo (2006), who apply SIT concepts to terrorism, point out;  
 
“...those groups with negative social identity use various strategies to reduce the 
psychological discomfort... Some strategic examples include assimilation, 
strengthening the group identity, direct challenge and violence.” (Arena & Arrigo, 
2006:30, emphasis added). 
Thus if political group members find their own group to be negatively evaluated compared to 
an outgroup (e.g. if the group perceive themselves as weak or marginalised) they may attempt 
to try to redress the balance through violent actions against the outgroup. Such actions are 
aimed at making their own identity, whether it be a religious or political identity, more 
positively evaluated. 
What is more, as individuals seek to create positive distinctiveness between the 
ingroup and the perceived outgroup, the members of the outgroup can become vilified and 
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dehumanised. Thus members of political, religious or ethnic activist groups, categorising the 
world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, may come to see all individuals in the perceived outgroup, 
whether they be an active threat (e.g. police or security forces) or harmless civilians, as 
subhuman, amoral or animalistic (Silke, 2004). Bandura (2004) suggests that dehumanisation 
is an important part of the moral disengagement required for individuals to engage in 
violence like terrorism; “it is easier to brutalize victims, for example, when they are referred 
to as ‘worms’” (ibid, p.136).Therefore the processes outlined in SIT can lead to civilians 
becoming valid targets for political groups. 
This theory can easily be applied to contemporary cases of terrorism. For example, 
the 7/7 London bombers viewed their ‘ingroup’ (i.e. Muslims) as being oppressed by the 
powerful Western ‘outgroup’26. Under SIT this would create a negative identity for the 
ingroup, and thus derogation of outgroup members (including the citizens who supported 
their ‘oppressive’ governments) and a desire to harm the outgroup. The use of violence 
against western citizens could therefore be motivated by the group’s desire to create an 
“assertive Muslim identity” (Rai, 2006:97); elevating the status of the ingroup and thus the 
self-esteem of the bombers themselves.  
SIT may also explain internecine violence between similar political groups, such as 
between Loyalist factions in Northern Ireland (McDonald, 2004) and FARC and the ELN in 
Colombia (BBC, 2006). Tajfel and Turner (2004:60) indicate that “similarity, proximity and 
situational salience” increase ingroup/outgroup comparisons. As making positive 
ingroup/outgroup comparisons is difficult when the groups lack considerable distinctiveness, 
groups may discriminate against and take violent action against similar groups.  
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 In his video statement, released after the bombings, Mohammed Sadique Khan spoke of the oppression of 
Muslims worldwide by western governments (Rai, 2006). 
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This theory benefits from its ability to integrate different levels of analysis. At the 
micro level, members of groups engage in violence on behalf of their group in order to 
enhance their own esteem. At the macro level, terrorism occurs because of the different 
statuses of the two groups; with the low status group seeking to increase its own self-
evaluation through conflict with the more powerful group. Furthermore, SIT processes 
should, theoretically, occur in groups of different sizes and shapes; from large, nebulous 
‘social movements’ to smaller, structured armed organisations. 
SIT is obviously, however, not a perfect model for terrorism. Again, though SIT is a 
well-researched theory in social psychology, the direct application of SIT to terrorist groups 
is limited. Also, though it is able to explain why outgroup civilians may become targets, it 
does not explain the actual engagement in terrorism; the movement from prejudice against 
the outgroup to actual violence is vague. Nevertheless, SIT may be a useful tool for 
explaining some of the processes that occur in groups using terrorism 
 
As terrorism is largely committed by groups, theories of group psychology should be highly 
applicable to the study of terrorism. This is especially true as the group acts as the point of 
interaction for the other levels of analysis; the individual is most likely turned into a 
‘terrorist’ through group processes, and structural factors have their effect through the 
group’s perceptions of them. The theories outlined in this chapter should therefore help to 
explain the occurrence of terrorism. 
Firstly, the study of leadership and obedience can potentially explain why individuals 
engage in terrorism when they are embedded in hierarchical groups. Just as soldiers carry out 
the orders of their superiors, some terrorists may be complying with the instructions of 
leaders who have made a tactical decision to use terrorism.  
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The dynamics of group decision-making may also be important in driving terrorism. 
If dissent is stifled and information is used in a biased way by the group during discussions 
regarding how to meet group goals, the groups could suffer from ‘groupthink’. The resulting 
faulty decision making could cause groups to therefore uncritically adopt risky and violent 
courses of action including terrorism. Evidence supporting this theory is, however, equivocal. 
Group polarisation theory may be a more viable alternative, due to its stronger research base. 
Members of radical political groups may become further radicalised through social 
comparison and exposure to persuasive arguments; leading them to have more extreme 
negative opinions of their enemies and to accept violence where they may not otherwise. 
Finally, Social Identity Theory, with its focus on ingroup versus outgroup, may be 
able to explain both the origins of conflict and why civilians may become valid targets in the 
eyes of group members. Furthermore, this theory is applicable to all groups; from large 
‘social movements’ to small radical political or religious groups. Social Identity Theory is 
vague, however, in how discrimination and prejudice turns into actual violence. 
In reality, all of the above group processes may be at play in terrorist organisations. 
Identity processes may cause demonization of citizens in the perceived ‘enemy outgroup’, 
while polarisation (and perhaps groupthink) in decision making cause the adoption of 
radicalised attitudes and violent courses of action
27
. Finally, obedience to leadership (or 
conformity in less structured groups) may then cause individual members to carry out the 
terroristic act itself. All of these theories do, however, suffer from a dearth of research in 
terms of terrorism. Their potential explanatory power would seem to warrant further study.  
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 The decision to use terrorism is not always unopposed by members of the group; in some cases it can lead to a 
more violent splinter group splitting from the main organisation (Crenshaw, 1990). Thus these processes may 
instead occur in a subsection of the larger group. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to examine whether social psychology, with a focus on group 
dynamics and processes, could offer a useful perspective from which to study the origins of 
terrorism. Chapter 1 outlined some of the structural and environmental factors that may be 
important in driving terrorism, such as political exclusion, deprivation and oppression. 
Individual-level explanations were then examined, which attempt to explain why only a few 
of those who experience such conditions actually become terrorists. These theories are 
troubled by conceptual problems, a lack of supportive evidence, and biased assumptions 
regarding the origins of behaviour. It is perhaps better to place the potential terrorist in 
context, and attempt to understand what social processes may explain why they adopt 
radicalised political or religious ideologies, and why they consequently join violent political 
groups.  
Chapter 2 firstly assessed whether two common explanations, brainwashing and 
contagion, were viable explanations for this process. A brainwashing explanation is flawed, 
as it requires that the individual be coerced into adopting a new ideology; something for 
which there is little evidence in terrorism. Contagion theory, the idea that the media is 
responsible for the spread of terrorism, would appear to be similarly unsound. Although there 
is evidence of ‘waves’ of similar terrorist attacks and groups forming, these can be explained 
by communication and cooperation between groups. Furthermore, research base on which 
this theory is based is equivocal, and media is unlikely to affect those who do not already 
have significant sympathies with the viewed terrorists. The observation that new members in 
terrorist groups often have existing ties with other members implies that psychological 
research into socialisation would be a more useful explanation of radicalisation and 
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recruitment. Indeed, Levine and Moreland’s (1994) model provides a useful description of 
the processes involved in joining a terrorist group, and the associated radicalisation of 
attitudes and beliefs. 
The final chapter examined a number of psychological theories that may be able to 
explain how the dynamics in radical political groups may lead them towards committing 
terrorism. Group norms demanding obedience to leadership may cause members of terrorist 
groups to comply with the decisions of their superiors, even if they would not otherwise. In 
less structured groups, simple conformity factors may serve the same function; causing 
individuals to carry out actions on the basis of group decisions. Groupthink theory suggests 
that faulty decision-making (with the stifling of dissent and uncritical analysis of information) 
may be responsible for engagement in terrorism. Though this theory lacks strong research 
support, it may act as a useful descriptive tool. Group polarisation theory, with its strong 
research base, may provide a better explanation for why groups radicalise and engage in 
terrorism via social comparison between members and exposure to persuasive arguments. 
Finally, in political groups, social identity processes may lead to the derogation of perceived 
‘outgroup’ members, including civilians. Violence may be used in order to create ‘positive 
distinctiveness’ for the ingroup compared to the outgroup. 
This paper therefore presents a process model for terrorism on the basis of social 
psychological factors. Significantly, this approach does not assume anything special about 
either terrorists or terrorist groups; they are neither inherently mad nor bad. The processes are 
the same as in many (even all) groups, albeit exaggerated by radical ideologies and 
environmental factors. Terrorist groups are formed when collectives of individuals perceive 
an injustice in society that they desire to right. As few individuals in oppressive or deprived 
situations actually become terrorists, and there is little evidence of terrorist abnormality, 
terrorism would appear to be a group-level reaction to environmental factors. Crenshaw 
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(1990:251) points out that “the existence of the group frequently precedes the move to 
terrorism.” Groups that use terrorism therefore rarely start out with the intention to harm 
civilians; instead, polarisation and identity processes may act to radicalise the group to the 
point that civilians become viable targets for violence. Individuals may join the group if they 
believe that it may be able to help them reach their goals, and will internalise the group’s 
radicalised ideologies, rules and norms. Finally, obedience to authority and conformity to 
group norms (combined with the belief that their actions are just and necessary) help to impel 
the individual member to carry out terrorism on the behalf of the group.  
The conclusions reached here are tentative due to the lack of direct study of these 
processes in terrorist groups. What is more, the processes explored here are just a few 
pertinent examples from the social psychology literature. Though direct study of group 
psychology in terrorist organisations is evidently very difficult, further research from a group 
psychological perspective may provide more insights into why terrorism occurs. Future study 
should also attempt to identify the psychological processes underlying the formation of the 
groups that later radicalise. Finally, an understanding of terrorist group psychology may have 
significant implications for counterterrorism. There is a growing understanding that the 
profiling and targeting of individual terrorists is of limited value
28
. Initiatives aimed at 
political groups rather than individuals, with the intention of reducing radicalisation and 
polarisation (as well as offering alternatives to violence), could be more successful in 
combating terrorism. 
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 For example, MI5 recently produced a report stating that there is no typical demographic profile or 
abnormality in British terrorists (Travis, 2008). 
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